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James M. Poterba and Jurgen von Hagen 
The rise and persistence of  sustained budget deficits in many developed and 
developing nations during the last three decades is a subject of great concern 
and interest to both policymakers and researchers. The persistence of  these 
deficits makes them incompatible with optimal fiscal strategies such as tax 
smoothing, and the observation that deficits rose simultaneously in many na- 
tions defies explanations focusing on particular economic developments in in- 
dividual countries. Recent attempts to explain why governments run large and 
persistent deficits have, therefore, focused on political and institutional factors 
and their effect on fiscal outcomes. Turning to such factors, and by implication 
to differences in national political and institutional developments, may also be 
a promising avenue to explain why fiscal policies in countries exposed to simi- 
lar economic shocks performed in remarkably different ways during the 1970s 
and 1980s. While precise evaluation of the economic effects of budget deficits 
is a difficult exercise, leading figures in many nations have called for deficit 
reduction, and there have been numerous policy debates concerning the design 
of  fiscal institutions that will restrict budget deficits and limit the growth of 
national debt. Several nations-New  Zealand, Denmark, Sweden, and Ireland, 
to name just a few-adopted  institutional changes in the  1980s and  1990s 
hoping that this would enable them to achieve greater fiscal discipline. 
The Maastricht Treaty’s provisions for European Monetary Union (EMU) 
have also drawn increased attention to the relationship between fiscal rules and 
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fiscal policy outcomes. To avoid situations in which deficit spending by a mem- 
ber nation could necessitate a “bailout” by  the European Central Bank, the 
treaty requires that EMU member nations avoid “excessive deficits,” that is, 
deficits exceeding 3 percent of GDP. The Stability and Growth Pact signed in 
Amsterdam in June 1997 strengthened the Maastricht Treaty’s original provi- 
sion by  adding a quasi-automatic review process and financial fines imposed 
on countries having excessive deficits. How  such antideficit provisions will 
affect the fiscal performance of the EMU member countries, however, remains 
an open question. While it is easy to write such rules into a treaty, it is much 
more difficult to enforce them and to evaluate their net effect on fiscal policy. 
Member nations might respond, as the designers of the rules intended, by care- 
fully avoiding large deficits and by reacting promptly to negative fiscal shocks 
by raising revenues and reducing outlays. But member nations might also re- 
spond by  shifting expenditures to off-budget accounts or engaging in other 
types of “creative accounting” that would enable them to comply with the let- 
ter, but not the spirit, of the antideficit provisions. 
The effect of budget institutions, including such deficit rules, on fiscal policy 
outcomes has been an active subject of  theoretical and empirical research in 
the last decade. There is now a substantial literature that attempts to model the 
interaction between fiscal rules and fiscal outcomes, and that provides empiri- 
cal evidence on the importance of  these links. Stimulated in part by political 
processes such as European monetary unification and calls for a balanced- 
budget amendment in the United States, researchers have studied cross-country 
differences in fiscal institutions, the rare episodes of budgetary reform in indi- 
vidual nations, and the budgeting and financing rules of the US.  states. These 
studies are designed to obtain new insight on the relationship between fiscal 
rules and fiscal policy  outcomes. Research in this area involves a constant 
interplay between political-economic modeling, case study and institutional 
analysis, and statistical investigation. 
In the inaugural research meeting of the University of Bonn’s Zentrum fur 
Europaische Integrationsforschung (ZEI), a group of researchers met in June 
1997 at a conference cosponsored by  ZEI and the National Bureau of Eco- 
nomic Research (NBER) to present their latest work on budget rules and fiscal 
policy. The program included thirteen papers addressing a range of questions 
relating to the economic effects of  fiscal institutions. The papers presented 
covered three distinct areas of research: new  theoretical models of  what ex- 
plains the rise and persistence of budget deficits; new empirical evidence on 
the relationship between fiscal rules and fiscal policy outcomes, such as defi- 
cits and the response of fiscal policy to aggregate economic shocks; and case 
studies of the effects of budget rules on the behavior of policymakers and other 
actors involved in the fiscal policy process. 
This volume presents the research findings that were reported at the confer- 
ence. The remainder of  this introduction distills several broad  lessons that 3  Introduction 
emerged from the presentations and discussion at the conference, and then 
presents a brief summary of each of the research papers that follow below. 
Common Themes 
The research in this volume suggests several important conclusions about 
fiscal institutions and fiscal policy. First, there is an emerging consensus that 
persistent budget deficits can be modeled as the result of a rational choice by 
self-interested political actors. Deficits arise because the government’s general 
tax fund is a “common property resource” from which projects of public policy 
are being financed, much like the aggregate stock of  a resource in resource 
economics. This induces a “common-pool problem” in which competing polit- 
ical groups vie for government expenditures that are financed using broad- 
based tax instruments.  As in models of geographically concentrated pork barrel 
spending, the costs of higher deficits are broadly dispersed, while the benefits 
of  higher deficits, primarily higher spending on particular projects, transfer 
programs, or lower tax rates on particular types of income, are concentrated. 
This results in higher deficits than political actors who internalized the costs 
of  spending and deficits would choose. This last aspect means that budgeting 
decisions under an  unmitigated common-pool problem are inefficient in the 
sense that all actors involved would choose lower levels of spending and defi- 
cits if they took the full costs into account. 
One critical implication of common-pool models is that fiscal rules that lead 
participants in the budgeting process to internalize the costs of budget deficits 
will lead to smaller budget deficits. The more fragmented the budget process 
is, that is, the less individual actors take into account the externality created by 
the general tax fund, the larger is the bias toward higher spending and larger 
deficits. Fragmentation can arise when there are many actors involved in the 
budget process, and when the decision-making processes in which these deci- 
sion makers interact diffuses power. Centralization of the budget process in- 
volves institutional provisions conducive to internalizing the externality. This 
can be achieved by limiting the number of actors in the budget-making process, 
by  centralizing budgeting authority in the hands of a fiscal entrepreneur, or by 
implementing decision-making rules,  such as  cooperative bargaining pro- 
cesses, among the relevant actors. The prediction that centralization leads to 
smaller deficits is one of  those considered in several empirical papers in this 
volume. 
Transparency is a key dimension of  centralization, and one along which 
budget systems vary. It appears to be correlated with budget outcomes.  A trans- 
parent budget process is one that provides clear information on all aspects of 
government fiscal policy. Budgets that include numerous special accounts and 
that fail to consolidate all fiscal activity into a single “bottom line” measure 
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cipants in the policymaking process, and that do present consolidated informa- 
tion, are transparent. Higher levels of transparency are associated with lower 
budget deficits. 
A second common theme that emerges from the empirical work is broad 
agreement that fiscal institutions have important effects on fiscal policy out- 
comes. The empirical evidence supporting this proposition arises from em- 
pirical studies of  OECD nations, states within the United States, provinces 
in Argentina, cantons in Switzerland, and cross-national evidence for Latin 
America. The empirical evidence suggesting that institutions matter is stronger 
than the evidence on the mechanisms by which these institutions matter. 
Third, institutional environments of national fiscal policy are complex and, 
therefore, difficult to  model and to  characterize empirically. Empirical re- 
searchers have developed a number of different ways of characterizing budget 
rules, political institutions, and other factors that may affect fiscal policy. One 
branch of  the recent research develops numerical indexes summarizing key 
aspects of  the relevant institutions. Such indexes can be used in regression 
analysis, but hardly do full justice to the complex reality of budgets. Further- 
more, they involve questionable assumptions of substitutability between indi- 
vidual institutional rules. Case studies, in contrast, make room for more de- 
tailed description, but defy statistical analysis. An important insight from the 
conference is, therefore, that different methodological approaches lead to simi- 
lar conclusions regarding the role of  fiscal institutions. In the end, different 
methodologies should, therefore, be regarded as complements rather than sub- 
stitutes. 
Fourth, while the evidence from both  approaches strongly suggests that 
fiscal institutions are important determinants of  fiscal outcomes, a recurrent 
theme of the discussion is that the institutions must themselves be regarded as 
endogenous. The questions when, and why,  governments adopt institutional 
reforms remain important challenges for future research in the political econ- 
omy of fiscal policy. 
In the next section, we summarize the papers presented at the conference in 
three broad groups, corresponding to their different methods of inquiry. 
The Relevance of Fiscal Institutions: Overview and Theory 
The first chapter in the volume is a broad survey of  theoretical as well as 
empirical work on budget policy. Albert0 Alesina and Roberto Perotti’s chap- 
ter, “Budget Deficits and Budget Institutions,” presents a valuable overview on 
the existing state of research on the determinants of fiscal policy. The chapter 
outlines the existing theoretical models of budget determination, which draw 
on game theory, formal political science, macroeconomics, and public finance 
to develop an understanding of the factors that might affect budget outcomes. 
The authors emphasize models in which deficits arise because some of  the 
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even though they can receive the full benefits of additional expenditures. The 
chapter also surveys existing empirical work and thereby provides a motivation 
for the various data analyses presented in the second part of this volume. The 
authors argue that the available literature suggests that budget procedures and 
budget institutions, both procedural rules and balanced-budget laws, influence 
budget outcomes. The chapter concludes with a discussion of  several unre- 
solved issues, including the trade-offs between fiscal restraint and other factors 
that may be associated with tight budget rules, and the potential endogeneity 
of fiscal institutions. 
The second chapter is And&  Velasco’s  study, “A  Model of  Endogenous 
Fiscal Deficits and Delayed Fiscal Reforms.” Velasco develops a dynamic, 
political-economic model of fiscal policy in which government resources are a 
“common property” out of which interest groups can finance expenditures on 
their preferred items. This setup has  striking macroeconomic implications. 
First, fiscal deficits and debt accumulation occur even when there are no rea- 
sons for intertemporal smoothing of tax and expenditure burdens. This finding 
stands in contrast to much of the positive theory of intertemporal fiscal policy, 
which  holds  that  governments run  deficits  when  their current expenditure 
needs are high relative to their long-run needs, or their current tax capacity is 
low relative to long-run capacity. Second, the chapter shows that deficits re- 
sulting from this “common pool” problem can be eliminated through a fiscal 
reform, but such a reform may only take place after a delay during which gov- 
ernment debt is built up. 
The last chapter in this section, by  Adriana Arreaza, Bent Sorensen, and 
Oved Yosha, considers the degree to which governments use fiscal policy to 
smooth private-sector consumption in the face of macroeconomic shocks. This 
chapter is directly relevant to debates about monetary union, because one of 
the important issues any time nations or states cede some authority to a central- 
ized governing body is the degree to which this body will be able to carry out 
redistribution across member states. The chapter, “Consumption Smoothing 
through Fiscal Policy in OECD and EU Countries,” compares the current con- 
sumption-smoothing patterns in the OECD and in the European Union (EU). 
The results suggest that EU  countries rely more strongly than other OECD 
countries on government transfers, rather than government consumption, to 
smooth cyclical shocks. Furthermore, the evidence suggests that governments 
with persistently high deficits are less able to smooth consumption than gov- 
ernments with low average deficits. Finally, the authors show that countries 
with  relatively  strong elements of  centralization in  their budget  processes 
achieve a higher degree of consumption smoothing through fiscal policy than 
countries with relatively fragmented budget processes. The implication is that 
fiscal institutions that reduce the government’s deficit bias also strengthen its 
ability to run large deficits in responding to adverse economic shocks. This 
finding implies that the nature of  budget rules can have an important impact 
on the government’s power to carry out efficient fiscal stabilization. 6  James M. Poterba and Jiirgen von Hagen 
Empirical Evidence on the Effects and the Choice of Fiscal Institutions 
The results surveyed and presented in the first three chapters provide an 
important warrant for empirical analysis of the factors that determine budget 
outcomes. The majority of chapters in this volume present new empirical evi- 
dence, based on statistical analysis of cross-sectional or panel data, on the ef- 
fect of  budget rules or political variables on fiscal policy outcomes. Each of 
these chapters suggests that there is an important correlation between a set of 
budget rules or procedures and fiscal outcomes at the national or subnational 
level. Several of these studies develop new databases on fiscal institutions and 
fiscal policy outcomes in particular regions or nations. Taken together these 
studies represent substantial evidence supporting the importance of fiscal rules 
in determining tax and expenditure levels. 
The first chapter in this spirit is by Yianos Kontopoulos and Roberto Perotti; 
it is titled “Government Fragmentation and Fiscal Policy Outcomes: Evidence 
from OECD Countries.” This chapter explores the effects of political factors, 
procedural factors (such as the budget process), and ideology in shaping the 
fiscal outcomes for OECD countries throughout the  1960-95  period. The 
chapter begins with a theoretical model of how fragmentation affects the bud- 
get process. The empirical analysis suggests that fragmentation, particularly 
when measured by  the number of  participants in the deliberations that ulti- 
mately determine the budget, has an important effect on fiscal policy  out- 
comes. It also indicates that ideology, as measured by the position of the ruling 
party on a liberalkonservative spectrum, is a substantively important determi- 
nant of fiscal policy. 
Ernesto Stein, Ernesto Talvi, and Alejandro Grisanti also find support for the 
role of fiscal institutions in their chapter, “Institutional Arrangements and Fis- 
cal Performance: The Latin American Experience.” This chapter explores the 
links between electoral systems, budget institutions, and fiscal performance in 
Latin America. It considers four measures of fiscal performance: the level of 
government expenditures, the size of  the deficit, the size of  the public debt, 
and the response of  fiscal policy to business cycle fluctuations. It finds evi- 
dence that electoral systems characterized by a high degree of proportionality 
(i.e., proportional representation) tend to have larger governments, larger defi- 
cits, and a more procyclical response to the business cycle, unless they are 
constrained by institutional rules producing greater centralization of the budget 
process. It also finds that more transparent and centralized budgetary proce- 
dures lead to lower deficits and debt. Furthermore, strengthening budget proce- 
dures for the central government can weaken the effect of proportional repre- 
sentation on fiscal policy outcomes. 
The next chapter presents further analysis of  fiscal institutions and fiscal 
policies in Latin America. Mark P. Jones, Pablo Sanguinetti, and Mariano Tom- 
masi, in “Politics, Institutions, and Public-Sector Spending in the Argentine 7  Introduction 
Provinces,” exploit the substantial cross-sectional variation in the fiscal rules 
within Argentina to develop and test models of political-economic interactions. 
They study the behavior of provincial public finances since Argentina’s return 
to democracy in 1983. Their empirical model is based on the “common pool” 
theory of deficit determination, and the empirical results suggest that the tax- 
sharing mechanism, coparticipacion Jiscal, by which the national government 
devolves taxes to the provinces, is an important determinant of provincial fiscal 
behavior. Budget procedures and other institutions are also crucial for fiscal 
performance. Party affiliation of  the provincial governors in relation to most 
of  the national executive is a key factor in ameliorating or exacerbating the 
incentive for provinces to “free ride” on the common pool. The latter finding 
is particularly intriguing, since it suggests that political factors may  interact 
with fiscal rules in determining policy outcomes. 
The next two studies also exploit variation in fiscal rules at the subnational 
level to provide evidence on the economic consequences of  different rules. 
Lars P.  Feld  and Gebhard Kirchgassner, in their chapter “Public Debt and 
Budgetary Procedures: Top Down or Bottom Up? Some Evidence from Swiss 
Municipalities,” study the effects of  referendum approval of  budget deficits. 
Referendum approval is a form of direct democracy: it essentially subjects the 
level of  deficit spending or government borrowing to a popular vote. Their 
study analyzes a cross section of the 13 1 largest Swiss municipalities and de- 
velops a new database on fiscal institutions and fiscal outcomes in these munic- 
ipalities. The data suggest that there is a great deal of  heterogeneity in the 
budgeting rules used in different municipalities, so the Swiss experience pro- 
vides a valuable setting in which to test alternative models of  fiscal policy 
choice. The authors explore the link between institutional structure and fiscal 
outcomes and find that municipalities with direct-democracy provisions for the 
approval of new debt issues exhibit lower levels of debt per capita than those 
municipalities without such provisions. 
The final chapter on subnational fiscal policy, by James M. Poterba and Kim 
Rueben, is  entitled “State Fiscal Institutions and the U.S. Municipal Bond 
Market.” The fiscal policy experiences of the U.S. states, which are autono- 
mous but are linked through participation in  a currency union (the United 
States), may provide useful lessons on the potential effects of European mone- 
tary union. This chapter presents new evidence on the effect of  state fiscal 
institutions, particularly balanced-budget rules and restrictions on state debt 
issuance, on the yields on state general obligation bonds. The authors find that 
states with tighter antideficit rules, and states with more restrictive provisions 
on the authority of state governments to issue debt, face lower borrowing costs. 
The interest rate differential between a state with a very strict antideficit consti- 
tution, and one with a lax constitution, is between  10  and  15 basis points. 
States with binding revenue limitation measures tend to face higher borrowing 
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bond market participants consider fiscal institutions in assessing the risk char- 
acteristics of tax-exempt bonds, and further support the view that fiscal institu- 
tions have real effects on fiscal outcomes. 
The last chapter in this section focuses on the experience of countries in the 
OECD or the European Union. Mark Hallerberg and Jurgen von Hagen explore 
the  interplay between  electoral systems,  proportional  representation  versus 
plurality, and institutional arrangements to achieve a higher degree of central- 
ization of the budget process. Their paper, “Electoral Institutions, Cabinet Ne- 
gotiations, and Budget Deficits in the European Union,” argues that electoral 
systems restrict the type of budgetary institutions at the government’s disposal. 
In states with plurality systems, where one-party governments are the norm, 
centralization can be achieved effectively by delegating strong agenda-setting 
powers to the finance minister, who thus becomes the fiscal entrepreneur. The 
authors also show that in states with systems of proportional representation and 
where multiparty coalitions are the common form of government, the proper 
institutional solution to the “common pool” problem is a commitment to fiscal 
targets negotiated among the coalition partners. These institutional choices are 
determined by  the different enforcement mechanisms implied by  single and 
multiparty governments. 
The empirical section of this chapter shows that, among the EU states, elec- 
toral systems help predict the choice of institution  to achieve greater fiscal 
discipline. The implication is that one should not expect fiscal targets such as 
those  imposed  by  the Maastricht Treaty to promote fiscal consolidation  in 
states where single-party governments are the rule. The chapter also shows that 
the two mechanisms, delegation of decision-making powers to a strong finance 
minister and commitment to fiscal targets, contributed to reducing deficits in 
the EU states during the period 1980-94. 
Case Studies of Budgetary Institutions 
Analyzing  data on the correlation between budget  rules  and budget  out- 
comes, as the foregoing chapters do, provides a valuable source of evidence 
on the determinants of fiscal policy, but it may neglect important institutional 
features of the budget process. The last four chapters in the volume consider 
the evolution and effects of budget rules in one nation, or a small set of nations. 
While these chapters present quantitative evidence on budgeting procedures, 
they can also be viewed as case studies of particular budgeting rules. 
The first is J. Edgardo Campos and Sanjay Pradhan’s report, “Budgetary 
Institutions and the Levels of Expenditure Outcomes in Australia  and New 
Zealand.” This chapter extends previous research suggesting that key budget- 
ary institutions are important in controlling aggregate spending. It looks be- 
yond the issue of fiscal discipline and argues that aggregate fiscal discipline is 
necessarily linked to the issues of allocative and technical efficiency. Hence, 
in identifying the impact of budgetary institutions, the paper suggests taking a 9  Introduction 
broader and more systemic perspective. Based on the reform experiences of 
New Zealand and Australia, it argues that these linkages embody transactions 
costs that could lead one country to adopt one set of  institutions, and another 
a different (though overlapping) set. Specifically, it shows that New Zealand 
sought to control aggregate spending by focusing on improving technical effi- 
ciency, while Australia sought to do so by introducing mechanisms to facilitate 
strategic prioritization and to enhance allocative efficiency. These are aspects 
of the micro budget process that have important effects on the aggregate level 
of spending. 
The second chapter, by Jakob de Haan, Wim Moessen, and Bjorn Volkerink, 
examines changes in the budget process in a small set of nations in the Eu- 
ropean Union. The chapter, “Budgetary Procedures-Aspects  and Changes: 
New Evidence for Some European Countries,” combines cross-sectional statis- 
tical analysis of a large data set on fiscal rules and fiscal policy, with a more 
specialized investigation of  budgeting in  several nations. This chapter ad- 
dresses two problems that arise in the empirical literature on the link between 
procedures that lead to the formulation, approval, and implementation of  the 
budget, and fiscal policy outcomes. First, budget institutions have many dimen- 
sions, and it is not clear which budget procedures have the greatest effect on 
policy outcomes. The chapter considers this issue using data from nations in 
the European Union. The results suggest that the position of the finance minis- 
ter in the budget process and the presence or absence of  binding constraints 
appear most important in determining the level of budget deficits. This sup- 
ports the findings in earlier papers of the importance of centralization in bud- 
get procedures. 
The second part of  the chapter considers the evolution of  budget rules in 
several nations that have adopted some procedural changes during the last fif- 
teen years. In one case, Sweden, changes in the budgetary process were precip- 
itated by an acute financial crisis. In several other nations that exhibit reported 
changes in the budget process during the last decade, it is more difficult to 
identify the motivation for reform, or to evaluate its impact on fiscal policy. 
The third chapter in this section is Thomas J. Courchene’s study, “Subna- 
tional Budgetary and Stabilization Policies in Canada and Australia.” It focuses 
on the relationship between institutional structures and subnational fiscal and 
budgetary processes in two nations that were part of  the British Empire, but 
which evolved quite different budget rules. The chapter explains the institu- 
tional arrangements that have led the Australian government to be more cen- 
tralized and egalitarian than its Canadian counterpart and that have made the 
Canadian provinces more fiscally autonomous than the Australian states. One 
episode that receives particular attention is the expansion of borrowing by the 
Canadian province of Ontario in the late 1980s, and the effect of this borrowing 
on the aggregate government sector in Canada. 
Courchene’s analysis also focuses on the implications of government struc- 
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of subnational fiscal stabilization policy, for subnational borrowing autonomy, 
and for the extent of  economic and budgetary coordination between the na- 
tional and subnational governments. It also considers the recent shift toward 
“hard budget constraints” in the Canadian provinces and presents some evi- 
dence, along the lines of Poterba and Rueben’s evidence for the United States, 
suggesting that the credit ratings of Australian states and Canadian provinces 
is affected by their fiscal position. 
The final chapter, by  Maurice Wright, focuses on budgeting outcomes in 
Japan. In “Coping with Fiscal Stress: Illusion and Reality in Central Govern- 
ment Budgeting in Japan,  1975-1997,”  Wright describes how  the Japanese 
government has coped with conditions of almost continuous fiscal stress, in- 
cluding budget deficits, accumulated debt, and increasing costs of debt servic- 
ing, during the last two and one-half decades. He concludes that policy choices 
were largely unsuccessful in  achieving their stated fiscal objectives, which 
were to substantially reduce government deficits. An illusion of discipline and 
control was created through manipulation of the budgetary system and the ex- 
ploitation of the rules of the game on the part of budget makers. In reality, the 
central government was either unable or unwilling to control the growth of 
government spending over this period. Wright’s analysis is a cautionary note 
to those who suppose that merely enacting a deficit reduction target will lead 
to deficit reduction. 
The Main Lessons 
The research findings summarized in this volume represent an important 
addition to our knowledge of how fiscal policy is affected by budgeting institu- 
tions. A first, important insight is that the common-pool approach to the analy- 
sis of  public spending and deficits is promising and powerful in explaining 
the emergence of large and persistent deficits. As the common-pool approach 
focuses on a problem of  coordination failure among the decision makers in- 
volved in public budgeting, the implication is that large deficits may be avoided 
by  strategic design of the budget process, that is, by institutions that distribute 
authority and facilitate agreement on the efficient outcome. Procedural design 
thus emerges as an important alternative to rules restricting the outcome of the 
budget process, such as balanced-budget laws. 
Second, effective institutional design of  the budget process to reduce the 
spending and deficit bias of  governments promotes a comprehensive view of 
the costs and benefits of public policies. If  centrdization of the budget process 
relies on delegating power to an individual decision maker, the key is that this 
individual be driven less by particularistic spending interests than the spending 
ministers. If centralization relies on common agreements on fiscal targets, the 
key is that these targets be agreed upon early in the budget process, that the 
agreement is negotiated by  all parties involved, and  that the  agreement is 
backed up by  strong enough punishments for violation to make it binding 11  Introduction 
throughout the budget process. Effective institutional design also includes ele- 
ments assuring the enforcement of efficient agreements, such as limits on par- 
liamentary amendments and a strong monitoring position of  the treasury in 
budget implementation to prevent policymakers from reneging on the initial 
agreement. 
The empirical work in several chapters emphasizes the richness of  budget 
institutions by  developing comprehensive characterizations of the entire bud- 
get process rather than by  focusing on the existence or absence of individual 
rules. The implication is that reform of  the budget process must consider the 
interaction of all stages of the process. 
Third, the empirical work presented in this volume shows that fiscal institu- 
tions matter not only for the average deficit, but also for other aspects of fis- 
cal performance. These include the government’s capacity for consumption 
smoothing, its ability to conduct macroeconomic stabilization policies, its in- 
clination to engage in political business cycles, and the cost of public debt. An 
important finding is that centralization of the budget process does not worsen 
the performance of budgetary policies in these other regards. 
Finally, the work presented in this volume suggests an intimate connection 
between the design of the budget process and other dimensions of a country’s 
constitution such as the position of the executive relative to the legislature, the 
strength of elements of direct democracy, and the type of electoral law. Budget- 
ary institutions that work in one constitutional context may  fail to work in 
others, because they do not provide the proper incentives and constraints to 
promote and enforce agreement on efficient levels of  spending and deficits. 
The implication is that reform of  the budget process cannot rely on a “one 
model fits all” approach but must consider a country’s broader constitutional 
framework and tradition. 
Future Directions 
The presentations and discussion at the ZEI-NBER meeting raise a number 
of  unresolved issues that stand as challenges for future research. The single 
most important issue for further work concerns the endogeneity of  budget 
rules, and the factors that lead policymakers to reform budget processes. Virtu- 
ally  all of  the  empirical papers in  this volume acknowledge the  potential 
econometric problems that are posed by  the fact that budget rules are not ran- 
domly assigned to nations or subnational  jurisdictions, but rather are the prod- 
uct of deliberate choice by  voters or their elected representatives. This makes 
it difficult to evaluate observed correlations between budget rules and budget 
outcomes: perhaps the observed relationships are simply due to a correlation 
between a third factor, voter preferences, and the these observed manifestations 
of voter preferences. Further work is clearly needed to explain where budget 
rules come from, and what factors lead to changes in these rules over time. 
Several papers argue that there are costs to changing budget rules, but there 12  James M. Poterba and Jiirgen von Hagen 
has been little analysis to date of what these costs are, and what makes some 
political actors willing to bear them, while others are not. 
A second issue that bears further investigation is the interaction between 
political factors and budgeting institutions in determining fiscal outcomes. As 
noted above, some of the empirical papers in this volume and in other papers 
suggest that the effectiveness of budget institutions in reducing the deficit bias 
depends on the general political setting of  the country considered. Providing 
further evidence on this issue will require careful empirical work, because bud- 
get rules and political variables are often highly correlated. 
Finally, the research in this volume underscores the need for further theoreti- 
cal and empirical research that sheds light on the description of budget institu- 
tions. Many of the empirical studies in this volume and the broader literature 
use indicator variables, “dummy variables,” for the presence or absence of par- 
ticular attributes of the budget process in particular nations or states. Others 
rely on indexes of budget stringency that are created by  adding together sets 
of indicator variables, or by  coding various aspects of budget policy on arbi- 
trary scales. Such additive indexes assume a strong form of  substitution be- 
tween different components of the budget process, and there is little evidence 
to support the assumptions underlying such aggregation. 
Existing empirical work clearly suggests that various aspects of budget insti- 
tutions matter, but the next generation of research should attempt to fine-tune 
these findings with  a more detailed investigation of  budget  rules. Moving 
ahead in this research program will require both theoretical development, to 
suggest the key features of the budget process that warrant measurement, and 
new  efforts to codify and measure budget institutions. The proposition that 
budget rules are simply a veil, which a median voter or set of political actors 
can pierce in setting fiscal policy, is not credible in light of the evidence devel- 
oped here and elsewhere. But the precise mechanism through which budget 
processes affect fiscal outcomes remains to be  documented, modeled, and 
tested. 
All of the methodologies featured in this book-theoretical  model-building, 
empirical analysis, and case study research-can  contribute to our further un- 
derstanding of  the economic effects of  fiscal policy  institutions. The fiscal 
pressures associated with the aging populations in many developed nations are 
likely to draw more, not less, attention to the factors that determine budget 
outcomes, and to make this a very promising area for research in the years and 
decades to come. 